Our main task is to study the effect of corporate governance on the market liquidity of lis ted companies' stocks. We establish a theoretical model that contains the heterogeneity of investors' beliefs to explain the mechanisms by which corporate governance improves liquidity of the corporate stocks. In this process we found that the existence of noise trad ers who are semi-informed in the market is an important condition for corporate governa nce to have the effect of improving liquidity of the stocks. We further find that the streng th of this effect is affected by the degree of noise traders' participation in market transac tions. Our model reveals that corporate governance and the degree of noise traders' parti cipation in transactions have a synergistic effect on improving the liquidity of the stocks.
Introduction
define that the purpose of corporate governance is a series of constraints and institutional arrangements formulated to solve the two types of agency conflicts and protect the interests of investors.
The liquidity of stocks studied in most of the existing literature refers to the liquidity of stocks in the secondary market. The liquidity that we focus on in this paper is also the li quidity of stocks in the secondary market. According to Harris (1990) , a security is said t o have higher liquidity if it can be sold in large quantities at lower transaction costs in a s hort period of time and its market price is less affected. The level of stock market liquidit y determines the level of utility investors get in their investments, so it also affects their i nvestment decisions. Therefore, Securities liquidity has been a research hotspot in the fin ancial market field, and a large number of related classic literatures have emerged, such as: Amihud (1986 Amihud ( , 2002 , Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) , Acharya and Pedersen (2005) , Liu (2006) , Amihud and Hameed et al. (2015) , etc. If an investor holds a security that h as lower liquidity, he has to sell it at a price significantly lower than the true value of the security when for some reason he needs to sell it in large quantities within a short period of time, as will bring him a greater loss. For securities with better liquidity, the holder ca n sell a larger number of such securities at a price close to its fair value in a short period of time, without causing a significant decline in the price of such securities. When the pr ospects of the securities market are not optimistic and investors are not confident, a larg e number of securities will be sold off, which will cause the prices of various securities in the market to decrease. When the prospects of the securities market are not optimistic a nd investors are not confident, a large number of securities will be sold off, which will ca use the prices of various securities in the market to fall. But at this time, the prices of se curities with higher liquidity tend to have a slighter decrease, so such securities play a rol e in stabilizing the market in decline.
Since 2002, more and more literature has begun to focus on the relationship between corporate governance and micro characteristics that the corporate stocks exhibit in mark et transactions. Gompers mpany's market value is also higher. The main topic of this paper is to study the impact of corporate governance on the market liquidity of listed companies' stocks. Using empiri cal tests, Bacidore, Sofianos (2002) and Chung (2006) show that stocks of the companie s in a more stringent external governance environment exhibit higher liquidity. Chen and Chung (2007) , Chung and Elder et al. (2010) , Li et al. (2012) , Prommin et al. (2014) , Ta ng and Wang (2015) use the data about listed companies in different countries to conduc t their empirical examinations respectively, but they get an almost consistent conclusion t hat there is a significant positive correlation between the quality of a company's internal governance and the level of the liquidity of its stocks. Existing literature focuses on seeki ng empirical evidence that there is a correlation between corporate governance and liqui dity of corporate stocks, while in this paper we mainly analyze the conditions and mecha nisms by which corporate governance affects the liquidity of corporate stocks. The issue studied in this paper lies in the intersection of the two fields of securities investment and corporate governance.
In the analysis of this paper, a company's executives and its controlling shareholders w ho can control the company in a large degree are considered as a whole that is called as the controlling community of the company. Compared with the controlling community, o utside investors' controlling power over the company is weak and they have less informat ion about the company. Controlling community can expropriate the funds of the company or the interests of minority shareholders. This behavior is usually called as expropriation, and the value that the controlling community extracts from the company and the minorit y shareholders is defined as agency costs. Therefore the benefits that outside investors c an obtain from each share they hold tend to be less than the benefits that the controlling community can gain from each share they hold. In the following, we refer to the actual value that each share of the company brings for outside investors as the outside investor' s value.
In order to analyze the mechanisms by which corporate governance affects the liquidit y of corporate stocks, we construct a model framework that contains the heterogeneity o f beliefs among different investors. In our theoretical model, investors in the market are divided into two types: informed traders and noise traders. The participation of noise tra ders in market transactions is an important condition for corporate governance to have t he effect of improving the liquidity of the corporate stocks. In addition, our model also sh ows that the increased degree of noise traders' participation in market transactions will g enerally increase the liquidity of stocks of listed companies in the market, which is aligne d with the conclusions of many classic literatures. In the assumptions of our model, infor med traders can accurately grasp all the information about the company, while noise trad ers can accurately seize the information which is directly disclosed to the public or easily accessible. The scale of agency costs which are relatively secret and not directly disclose d can't be accurately known by them. Thus, informed traders can accurately know the va lue of the corporate equity, while noise traders may have biased estimations on its value. The noise traders in our model are essentially "semi-informed" traders rather than compl etely uninformed traders. Simply speaking, one important role of corporate governance i n our model is to send noise traders a positive signal when they estimate the value of th e corporate equity, thereby reducing the possibility that they overestimate the agency co st of the company and the extent to which their estimations deviate from the actual valu e that the equity can bring to them.
The core part of our model building can be divided into four steps. (1) Using discounte d cash flow method, we deduce the estimations of different types of investors on the out side investors' value of the corporate equity based on their own information about the ag ency cost of the company. (2) Consider a situation where some holders need to sell a lar ge amount of the corporate stocks in a short period of time. We assume that the transact ion is conducted by open auction among all types of outside investors in the market, so a n investor's estimation on the outside investors' value of the corporate equity determines the upper bound of his bids. We derive the probability distribution of the market price of the stock after the transaction is completed under market equilibrium. (3) Based on the probability distribution of its price, we design an index to measure the liquidity level of th e corporate stocks, as establishes a relationship between its liquidity and corporate gover nance as well as the participation of noise traders in trading. (4) Based on these relations hips, we analyze the effect of improving corporate governance on the liquidity of its stoc ks.
Finally, based on our theoretical model, we further demonstrates that corporate gover nance and the degree of noise traders' participation in trading have a synergistic effect o n improving the liquidity of the corporate stocks : when the degree of noise traders' parti cipation in trading increases, the liquidity of stocks of listed companies in the market will generally increase, and the liquidity of stocks of companies with better governance tends to get a greater increase than those with poor governance; additionally, compared with the periods when the degree of noise traders' participation in trading is low, improving th e quality of corporate governance in the periods when this degree is high can improve th e liquidity of the corporate stocks more greatly.
To make our analysis clear, we divide companies into two categories based on the pow er of the controlling community. For a company in the first category, there is no controlli ng community that have controlled the company for a long time, and they can't dictate t he company absolutely. In this kind of company, the quality of corporate governance det ermines the scale of the company's agency costs. We call this type of company as gener al-type company. In the analysis of general-type companies, our model framework includ es three roles of corporate governance. The first effect is that corporate governance can determine the maximum scale of the agency costs extracted by the controlling communit y. To be concrete, better governance can limit the scale of the company's agency costs t o a relatively smaller range. The basis of containing this role in our model framework is t he definition of corporate governance given by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) . The second ro le which has been emphasized in La- Porta et al.(2002) is that better governance can incr ease the possibility that the controlling community's behavior of expropriation is captured and the intensity of the punishment for this behavior, which will accordingly affect their choice of the agency costs that they will extract from the company. The third role which has been mentioned above is that better corporate governance can send a positive signal to the noise traders who have incomplete information when they estimate the value of t he corporate equity.
For a company in the second category, there is a controlling community that has firmly controlled the company for a long time, so the value of its agency costs tends to be fixe d. In this kind of company, the controlling community have absolute control over the co mpany and can even determine the arrangement of corporate governance in the compan y. Due to various reasons such as the requirements of the regulatory authorities, the con trolling community also have to adjust the arrangement of corporate governance. Howev er, they will try to ensure that the original scale of the agency costs that they can extract will not be restricted when they adjust the arrangement. Therefore, in such special com panies corporate governance has a weaker impact on agency costs, while agency costs h ave a stronger influence on the quality of corporate governance. We call this kind of com pany as controlled-type company. Therefore, for controlled-type companies, the third afo rementioned role of corporate governance should be included in our model framework, w hereas the first and the second role should be excluded.
We arrange the structure of this paper as follows:
We first need to quantify the effect of corporate governance on its agency cost and an investor's estimation on the outside investors' value of the corporate equity based on his own information, as provide a theoretical basis for further research on the core issue of t his paper. We completed this work in section 2. Part of the analysis draws on the theoreti cal framework of the existing literature.
Based on the conclusions of section 2, we construct our theoretical model in section 3 and 4.
In section 3, we established a theoretical model that contains the heterogeneity of inve stors' beliefs. By this model, we give an explanation for the mechanisms by which corpor ate governance generate an effect of improving the liquidity of the corporate stocks, as well as derive an important condition for apparent occurrence of this effect.
In Section 4, based on the model framework in Section 3, we further demonstrate that the strength of the effect that corporate governance improves the liquidity of the corpor ate stocks is affected by the degree of noise traders 'participation in stock trading. Likewi se, the strength of the effect that noise traders' participation in trading improves the liqui dity of stocks will also be affected by the quality of corporate governance. In other words, we prove that corporate governance and noise traders' participation have a synergistic e ffect on improving liquidity of stocks.
The analysis in parts 3 and 4 is targeted at general-type companies. In Section 5, we focus on controlled-type companies and do relevant research. Our the oretical model indicates that the conclusions we draw in Sections 3 and 4 are still valid fo r this particular type of companies.
In Section 6, we summarize our analysis and give some policy recommendations.
The Impact of Corporate Governance on the Outside Investors' Value of the Corporate Equity
For general-type companies, the main process by which corporate governance affects t he outside investors' value of their Equity is shown below: Figure 1 As shown in Figure 1 , firstly, corporate governance determines the scale of the agency costs in a company; then, the agency cost will affect the outside investors' value of the c orporate equity. Additionally, outside investors will also utilize their information about the agency cost of the company when estimating the outside investors' value. There are ma ny important factors that can affect the outside investors' value of the corporate equity, and agency cost is one of them. The higher the agency cost of a company, that is, the c ontrolling community's expropriation of the outside investors' interests is more serious, th en the lower the outside investors' value of the corporate equity, that is, the earnings obt ained by the outside investors will be reduced.
In section 2.1, we model the process of corporate governance determining actual agen cy costs, using an analysis framework similar to La Porta and Lopez-De-Silanes et al. (20 02) . In section 2.2, we model the process of agency costs affecting the outside investors' value of the corporate equity and an investors' estimation on the outside investors' value based on his own information. In this way, we quantitatively characterize the impact of corporate governance on the outside investors' value in this section and provide a basis f or further research on the core issues of this paper.
Corporate Governance and Agency Costs
The analysis in this paper proceeds under continuous time settings. Consider a represe ntative company in the economy. Referring to the assumptions given by Morellec and Nik olov et al. (2012, 2018) , We set the production function of the company at the time of t as:
, . is the total output of the company at the time of t, and is the total amount of fun ds which it invests in production. denotes the company's capital depreciation rate, and represents the technical shock of the company at the time of t, and it is a random variable. Like the assumption of Mor ellec and Nikolov et al. (2012, 2018) , the products produced by the company at the time of t will sell out simultaneously and one unit product is sold at a unit price. The cost of pr oducing one unit product is which can be treated as the cost shock at the time of t an d is also a random variable. We define . Similar to the assumption of Nikolov et al. (2012, 2018) , we assume that the stochastic process is govern ed by a stochastic differential equation which is:
is a standard Brownian motion which reflects the uncertainty of productivity an d cost shocks. Therefore the profit of the company at the time of t is:
Now, we introduce the agent cost which is an important variable into our model in the form that has been used by morelec, Nikolov, et al. (2018), La porta, Lopez de silanes, et al. (2002), Shleifer, wolfenzon (2002) . They assume that the controlling community can extract a constant share of the company's profits at each moment and the share is re garded as the agency cost, where . To be concrete, it means that the cash flow which the controlling community expropriates from the company at any time t is a nd the remaining profit is then distributed among all shareholders of the co mpany on a pro rata basis. We suppose the controlling community holds a fraction of t he equity of the company totally. Here is exogenous and determined by its history or it s life-cycle. Thus, the total value of the cash that the controlling community can obtain at any time t is . Next, we introduce the factor of corporate governance into the model. In order to refle ct the inhibitory effect of corporate governance on agency costs, we assume that , that is, the extraction proportion of the controlling community can't exceed , where . Therefore, is a parameter which reflects the quality of corporate governance. For a company, the smaller is, the better its corporate governance is and the stronger the ability to restrain its agency costs. The literature we mentioned above a ssumes that and are constant and don't change with time. This assumption is used i n this paper for the convenience of analysis. In order to fully reflect the role of corporate governance in our model, we use the methods of La porta, Lopez de silanes, et al. (2002) to consider the punishment given to the controlling community for their illegally extracti ng corporate funds. Suppose that in a company, the share of profits extracted by the con trolling community is ρ,
The probability of their expropriation being caught and revealed is , where . That is, the larger the expropriation ratio ρ that the controlling community ch ooses, the greater the possibility that they will be punished; the worse the company's cor porate governance, the greater the possibility that they will be punished. The punishmen ts here include not only the fines imposed on them and the loss of their positions in the c ompany, but also the damage to their reputation in the industry.
After their expropriation is caught and revealed, they were punished with for eac h unit of the value they extracted, where . That is, the worse the company's c orporate governance, the less the punishment imposed on them.
Therefore, the expectation of the value that the controlling community is fined at t tim e t is: , where . Obviously, . The expectation of the value obtained by the controlling community at this time is:
Because the controlling community has control over the company, they can determine the total amount of capital that the company puts into production at each time and th en the output of the company. Their goal is to maximize their benefits at every time. The refore, at any time t, they should choose the optimal ρ and to solve the optimization p roblem:
In fact, solving this optimization problem is equivalent to solving the following two opti mization problems: and The first order condition of the optimization problem (2.3) is:
Then ρ becomes a function of the parameter of corporate governance:
Then ρ is an increasing function of the parameter , that is, the company with poor g overnance has relatively high agency cost. This is intuitive and aligned with the basic the ory of corporate governance. By equation (2.5), we can characterize the impact of corpo rate governance on the company's agency cost.
The solution to the optimization problem (2.4) is:
Solution (2.6) maximizes the expectation of the benefits of the controlling community at the time of t, as well as the profits of the company at this time.
Agency Cost and Outside Investor's Value of Stocks
When the controlling community adopts the optimal choice (2.5) and (2.6), the expe ctation of their benefits is:
If the number of the company's shares is , then the benefit for each share held by the controlling community at the time of t is:
The total income of all the outside investors at the time of t is:
Then the benefit for each share held by an outside investor at the time of t is:
Due to the existence of agency costs, the amount that the controlling group would ben efit more than outside investors from each share held is:
can be regarded as the benefit of control which has been extensively studied by existing literature. It can be easily deduced that decreases with the improvement o f corporate governance (i.e., the decrease of ).
For the convenience of later discussion, we define a stochastic process:
So at the time of t, the benefit that each share brings to an outside investor is:
According to the expression (2.1) of the stochastic process , using the Ito formul a can derive that the stochastic process is governed by the following stochastic dif ferential equation:
where and . and represent the initial states of the sto chastic processes and , respectively. We derive the solution of the above stochastic differential equation:
It's generally recognized that investors always estimate the value of the corporate equi ty based on the relevant information they have obtained. We assume that all outside inv estors can accurately know the company's parameters which are often directly disclosed to the public or easily accessible, including equity concentration θ, , , , , , , an d . Additionally, most of the information about the governance arrangement of listed co mpanies is publicly disclosed, and outside investors can learn about the quality of corpor ate governance of these companies through the information, so we assume that all of th em can accurately know the parameter of corporate governance. On the other hand, we assume that some of them are not able to precisely know the s cale of the agency cost because it's relatively secret and not directly disclosed. Thus th ere may exist heterogeneity between different investors' estimations on the agency cost of one company. In our model, investors who can accurately know the scale of the comp any's agency cost are regarded as informed traders, and the other investors are regarde d as noise traders. That is, the difference between noise traders and informed traders in our model lies in the accuracy of knowing the scale of agency costs.
We set a representative outside investor's estimation on the agency cost of the compa ny as which may be biased from the real value ρ. Then by equation (2.7) we deduce th at he tends to estimate the income brought by each share held by himself at the time of t as . Now we calculate which is defined as his estimation on the value of each share of the company at the time of t. We calculate by discounting a ll the cash flows obtained by holding one share after the time of t, and the discount rate of outside investors is set to γ.
The second equal sign of the above formula is derived by Fubini's theorem. From the p erspective of discounted cash flow method, the actual outside investor's value of each sh are at this time should be: since the real agency cost of the company is ρ. All the words "value" that occur in the rest of this paper refer to the outside investor's value of the corporate stocks.
Remark: The agency cost itself is a piece of information that is difficult to acquire direc tly. Although we follow La porta, Lopez de silanes, et al. (2002) to express the real agenc y cost as a function of the parameter of corporate governance by equation (2.5), in fa ct, noise traders usually can't use to precisely infer the agency cost of the company. T here are two main reasons. (1) In reality, the determinants of a company's agency cost a re complex and diverse, including the history of the company and its life-cycle. The ways in which various factors affect the agency cost are also changeable. Formula (2.5) is only a simplified and imprecise description of the scale of agency cost. (2) Due to poor infor mation and knowledge, it is difficult for noise traders to fully seize the factors that can inf luence the agency cost and the way in which these factors jointly determine the agency c ost.
the Effect of Corporate Governance on the Liquidity of Stocks

Investors' Heterogeneous Beliefs and the Basic Setting of Our Model
In this section, taking the existence of noise traders in market transactions, we analyze the mechanisms by which corporate governance affect the liquidity of the corporate stoc ks. The analysis in this section is for general-type companies, and we will give the corres ponding conclusions for controlled-type companies in section 5. Now We consider a representative listed company with the parameters described in Se ction 2. We assume that there exist both informed traders and noise traders in the marke t. The number of informed traders and noise traders in the market is and , respecti vely. and are both constants that do not change with time. Informed traders have complete information, including the real agency cost of the company and the actual outsi de investor's value of the corporate equity. Because they are completely informed, it's dif ficult for them to lose money in trading and they tend to make some profits. Therefore, we assume that all of them are always willing to use their information to participate in th e trading of the corporate stocks. Noise traders without complete information bear a cert ain degree of risk of loss in trading, so not all noise traders are always willing to participa te in trading. Furthermore, the number of people willing to participate in trading is rando m and potentially changes over time. Thus, following the assumptions in Easley, Kiefer a nd O'hara et al. (1996) , we suppose that the number of noise traders willing to participat e in market transactions over time follows a Poisson process with arrival rate λ. The large r the arrival rate λ, the higher the degree of noise traders' participation in trading and th e more active they are in the market. In the following we refer to λ as the degree of nois e traders' participation in trading.
We focus on a generalized situation in which a shareholder of the company has to sell out the company's stocks held by him at the time of because of his urgent need for ca sh. The total number of the shares held by him is . For the convenience of analysis, we assume that each investor in the market can only buy n shares of the company until t he time of . Therefore, at the time of , the shareholder will sell his shares by M deals that he will make with different investors, and each deal consists of n shares of the com pany. The price of each deal is determined by the open auction between investors who a re willing to participate in trading at that time. We assume that at a certain time point before the time point of , some transactions on the company's stocks have occurred in the market, as have caused that all the noise traders who are willing to participate at the time of have purchased ample shares in these transactions and left the market at the time of . Between the time of and , no transaction on the stocks of the company occurs. So the investors who will participate in the open auction at the time of include: (1) all informed traders in the market, the number of which is ;
(2) noise traders willing to participate in trading in the time interval [ , ] , the number of which is denote by . According to our assumption, obeys a Poisson distribution with parameter λ , w here . is the length of the time interval between these two transactions. We define . In addition, we assume that no trader in the market can become a large shareholder of the company and join the controlling community of the company through these transactions, so they only care about the outside investor's value of each s hare at the time of . Let denote the value of each share when there is no agency cos t in the company. By equation (2.9), we derive If the controlling community extract the cash flow of the company to the maximum ext ent permitted by the constraints of governance mechanisms of the company, that is, thei r expropriation ratio reaches the upper bound , by equation (2.9) the value of each sh are should be: It can be inferred ρ , since noise traders precisely know the parameter of c orporate governance. Because their estimations tend to be biased and the deviations bet ween their estimations and the real size ρ are random, we assume that all noise traders' estimations on the size of agency cost obeys a uniform distributed on the interval of and are mutually independent. Therefore, obeys a uniform distributed on the int erval of and are mutually independent.
Equilibrium Price of Each Share
In the process of this open auction which will complete at the time of , the following conditions usually hold. 
Condition 6.
Use to denote the price to pay for one share. If an investor believes that buying a stock makes him neither lose nor gain based on his information (i.e. ), he won't choose to buy it.
We also need to consider a special case in which the number of the noise traders who are willing to participate in trading is so small or the number of the shares that the shar eholders need to sell is so large that . This case essentially means that sellin g pressure in the market is heavy and the liquidity that noise traders can provide is not e nough. In this case, all traders willing to participate in trading have bought n shares and quit the market, whereas the seller still holds some shares that haven't been sold. We m ake the following assumptions. Assumption 1. If the seller who has to sell out his stocks at the time of quotes an as king price of , this price can effectively attract other noisy traders who were not willing t o participate in trading to buy the remaining shares from the seller at this time.
Because in the belief of noise traders in the market, the probability that the actual valu e of each share is lower than is 0, buying at the price of is unlikely to make them los e and may bring them earnings. Thus, Assumption 1 is reasonable.
We use the following proposition to explain what the market price of each share wi ll be after all the M deals are concluded under market equilibrium at the time of . In fa ct, is the equilibrium price of each share in the last deal (i.e. the M-th deal). Proposition 1. Suppose that there are totally N traders bidding in this open auction, wh ere is a constant positive integer. Their estimations on the outside investor's value of e ach share of the company in descending order is:
. Suppose that t he M deals are concluded under market equilibrium, then (1) if ; (2) if .
Proof.
For the convenience of our discussion, the trader who estimates the value of each shar e as is recorded as the trader for . In the state of market equilibrium, any trader who changes his bid alone won't increas e his benefits. In other words, the market is not in equilibrium if a trader in the market c an increase his earnings by modifying his own bid. Now we demonstrate that the first de al will be closed by the trader at the price of for each share. The first deal won't be concluded at a price of which is greater than , otherwis e the market can't be in equilibrium. (1) The price of for each share is unlikely to be bi dden by a trader where , as means that traders other than the trader won't bid for each share. The trader believes that buying each share at the price of w ould bring him a loss, because his estimation on the value of each share satisfies that .
(2) It is also impossible that the price of for each share is bidden by t he trader , because there still exists some space for him to lower his bid for the purpo se of increasing his benefits. For instance, it's profitable for him to lower his bid to a cert ain price of which satisfies that . By the bid of for each share, he can also close the first deal because the other traders whose estimations on the value of eac h share are not larger than won't give a bid larger than . Additionally, the first deal won't be concluded at a price of which is lower than for each share, otherwise the market can't be in equilibrium. There are at least two trade rs whose estimations on the value of each share is greater than , since . (1) If the trader who bids for each share and will conclude the deal is the trader , t he trader can give a higher bid of which satisfies that . By this bid, t he trader can replace the trader to close the deal and get a profit of in his belief. (2) If the trader who bids for each share and will conclude the deal isn't the trader , the trader can give a higher bid of which satisfies that . By this bid, the trader can replace the trader who bids for each sha re to close the deal and get a profit of in his belief. Therefore, the first deal can only be concluded at the price of for each share and t he trader who gives this bid and closes this deal must be the trader . It is not possibl e for the other traders to give bids which are greater than or equal to for each share. If the trader lowers his bid to ' (i.e. ' ) for each share, the trader will giv e a bid which is higher than ' but lower than for each share to replace him to buy t he stocks and make a profit. If the trader raises his bid, his profit will decrease. After the first deal is concluded, the trader will quit the market and not participate in the tr ansactions.
According to a similar analysis, we can deduce that the second deal will be concluded b y the trader at the price of for each share. It can be proved by mathematical ind uction that for any integer that satisfies , the k-th deal will be closed by the trader at the price of for each share. Therefore, if , we can deriv e that because the last deal (i.e. the M-th deal) will be concluded at the pric e of for each share. If N = M, the k-th deal will be concluded by the trader at the price of for k = 1,2, ..., M-1. Then all of them will quit the market, which results that only one trader w ho is the trader will bid for the last n shares. His optimal strategy is to give a bid of for each share, which ensures that he can conclude the last deal. (1) If he gives a bid th at is lower than , the seller can then quote an asking price of and sell the last n share s to another trader in the market according to Assumption 1. (2) On the other hand, givi ng a bid which is higher than can reduce his profit. Thus, we deduce that if . If , it's obvious that by Assumption 1.
By our settings, is obviously a random variable, as is also consistent with reality. If the selling pressure at the time of is so small that , it's obvious that ρ by Proposition 1. This means that the seller can sell each share held by him at a price that is not lower than the fair value of each share. Since this paper focus on the l iquidity of stocks, we assume that the selling pressure at this time is so large that in the rest of this paper.
Our Measurement of Liquidity of Stocks
It has been defined above that ρ is the actual outside investor's value of each share of the company at the time of and is the market price of each share after the shar eholder sells out all the shares held by him at this time. If ρ , we define ρ In fact, which is obviously a random variable denotes the discount rate of the market p rice of each share at the time of relative to its real value. In the following, we refer to as the discount rate. We define ρ ρ . Because it's obvious that according to Proposition 1, we derive ρ ρ So the range of is . Keeping the time interval , the degree of noise trader's pa rticipation λ and the trading volume fixed, the larger the discount rate , the larger the extent to which the price of each share deviates downwards from its fair value after t he trading. A discount rate of suggests that the seller obtained only 1-s of the real valu e of each share in the last deal, that is, he lost s • V (ρ) for each share. In order to chara cterize the liquidity level of stocks in our model framework, for any constant number i n , we can define λ ρ ρ and λ λ λ λ λ which can be seen as a function of , and λ is the natural logarithm o f the probability that the discount rate of the market price of each share relative to its fai r value is larger than after the trading. For a fixed , the greater the λ , the higher the level of liquidity of the stocks.
Consider two specific listed companies which are company A and company B. For any fi xed in , their levels of liquidity are λ and λ respectively. If λ λ holds for any , one can claim that the stocks of comp any A are more liquid than that of company B.
For a representative trader whose estimation on the value of each share at the time of is , use to denote the probability that the discount rate of his estimation r elative to the real value ρ is larger than , i. This means that trading in small quantities doesn't tend to cause a sharp decline in the m arket price of the stocks. If , we have the following conclusion: Proposition 2. At the time of , for any , the probability that the discount rat e of the market price of each share relative to its fair value is larger than is:
where . For any , Proof.
(1) Focus on the case in which . If which is the number of noise traders par ticipating in bidding satisfies that , then which is the total number of traders pa rticipating it satisfies that and we can derive by Proposition 1.
If , then and we can derive by Proposition 1. We still set th at the estimations on each share of all the traders in descending order is:
We additionally set that the estimations on each share of all the noise traders among all the traders in descending order is:
Notice that all the informed traders estimate the value of each share as its actual value which satisfies that . So, if , we can derive that and it follows that . Likewise, if , it's obvious that and it follows that . Therefore, we can deduce that . For convenience of our deduction, we define that ρ . ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ λ λ λ λ (2) By proposition 1, it's obvious that . Thus, for any constant in , we deri ve λ ρ ρ
For convenience of the following discussion, we define that Then, for any constant in , we derive λ λ
It can be seen from Proposition 2 that λ and λ have nothing to do w ith the starting and ending time points and , but are related to the interval time between them.
The Effect of Corporate Governance on Liquidity of Stocks
For any constant number in , by equation (3.1) , the probability that a noise tra der's estimation on the value of each share relative to its real value is greater than i s Recall that in section 2.1 we clarify that in general-type companies the controlling co mmunity will adjust the agency cost ρ as the quality of corporate governance changes. T hus, ρ can be seen as a function of and the form of this function has been given by e quation (2.5), i.e. ρ θ
In this part, we need to impose a technical and widely used condition to the function . This condition is that is a concave function of , as means that the marginal ag ency cost extracted by the controlling community is decreasing with the deterioration of corporate governance (i.e. the increase in the upper bound of the company's agency cost). Proposition 3. An increase in the degree of noise traders' participation in trading (i.e. ) will enhance liquidity of stocks generally in market. Improvements of corporate governa nce of the company have the effect of increasing the liquidity of its stocks if .
We use and to represent the partial derivatives of with respect to it s first and second independent variable. 
Summarization
Now we explain the economic intuition which underlies the construction of our theoreti cal model. For noisy traders who can't precisely know the actual value of the corporate equity by t he reasons of their incomplete information about the company, better corporate governa nce can send them positive signals which reduce the heterogeneity between their beliefs and the extent to which their estimations deviate from the reality as well as have the effe ct of reducing the probability that they underestimate the value of the equity and strengt hening their confidence to invest in the stocks of the company. The noise traders who ha ve received the signals will tend to give a higher bid for each share, thereby providing liq uidity for the stocks of the company in the secondary market. The existence of noise trad ers is an important condition for corporate governance to improve liquidity of the stocks. Based on Proposition 3, we have the following corollary.
Corollary. Under the case where there are no noisy traders in the market or they do not participate in any transactions, the effect of corporate governance on the liquidity of the stocks of the company tend to be extremely weak.
If
, for any constant in , we can derive by equation (3.4) . Then we conclude that by equation (3.5).
Synergistic Effect
Corporate Governance and the Effect of noise trading on liquidity
In proposition 3 we have deduced that an increase in the degree of noise traders' parti cipation in market transactions will promote the liquidity of stocks, as is consistent with E asley, Kiefer and O'hara et al. (1996) . We call this phenomenon as the effect of noise tra ders' providing liquidity for stocks. Consider a company with a parameter of corporate governance. When the degree of noise traders' participation in trading is which satisfi es that , the liquidity level of its stocks should be . If this degree then i ncreases to which satisfies that , the liquidity level will be lifted to . The increase is essentially quantifies the effect of noise traders' providing liquidity for the st ocks of this company. What we are interested in is whether changes with th e quality of corporate governance .
Suppose that there are two listed companies in the market and their parameters of cor porate governance are respectively and which satisfy that . Additionally, th e other parameters of them are almost the same. Based on the framework of the theoret ical model in Section 3, we draw the following conclusion: Proposition 4. For companies with better corporate governance, the effect of noise trad ers' providing liquidity for their stocks is more intense. In other words, when more noise traders begin to participate in market trading, the liquidity level of the stocks of these co mpanies will increase more greatly compared to the companies with worse corporate gov ernance, i.e. .
Proof.
Since in order to prove that , we only need to demonstrate that holds for any positive number . We define , then
Let denote the partial derivative of with respect to its first independent v ariable, then
We have proved that in Proposition 3. On the other hand, By equation (3.3), we can deduce that Therefore, we have derived that . We can further infer that b y equation (4.2) and it follows that equation (4.1) holds. The proof of this proposition is c ompleted.
Based on Proposition 4, we can infer that when the market trend is upward and various investors become more active in investment, the liquidity of the stocks of the companies with better corporate governance will increase more than those with worse corporate go vernance. On the other hand, when the market trend is downward and the activity of var ious investors in investment is weakened, the liquidity of the stocks of the companies wit h better corporate governance may decrease more than those with worse corporate gove rnance, but by Proposition 3 we can affirm that the liquidity level of the former is still hig her than the latter under this situation.
Noise Trading and the Effect of Corporate Governance on liquidity
In proposition 3 we have deduced that an improvement in corporate governance of a c ompany will promote the liquidity of its stocks, as is consistent with the empirical evidenc e of Chung, Elder, Kim(2010). We call this phenomenon as the effect of corporate govern ance on liquidity of stocks. Suppose that the degree of noise traders' participation in tradi ng is . For a representative company with a parameter of corporate governance, the liquidity level of its stocks should be at this time. If the corporate governance in the company is improved and the parameter of corporate governance consequently d ecreases to ( ), the liquidity level will be lifted to . The increase is essentially quantifies the effect of corporate governance on the liquidity of its stocks. What we are interested in is whether changes with the degree of noise traders' participation in trading .
Suppose that there are two stages of the market. In the first stage the degree of noise traders' participation in trading is and in the second stage this degree rises to (i.e. ). The company can improve its corporate governance and reduce the parameter f rom to in one of the two stages. Based on the framework of the theoretical model in Section 3, we draw the following conclusion: Proposition 5. The effect of corporate governance on the liquidity of the company's sto cks will become more intense when more noise traders participate in market trading. In other words, improving corporate governance in the stage when more noise traders parti cipate in trading can increase the liquidity of the company's stocks more greatly compare d to the stage when less noise traders participate, i.e. .
Proof.
Since in order to prove that , we only need to demonstrate that holds for any positive number . We define , then Combining Proposition 4 and Proposition 5, we can conclude that corporate governanc e and the degree of noise traders' participation in trading have a synergistic effect on inc reasing the liquidity of a company's stocks.
Conclusions for Controlled-type Companies
First of all, we suppose that for any listed company in market, noise traders don't kno w whether it is a general-type or controlled-type company.
The conclusions in section 3 and 4 are for general-type companies, while in this sectio n we focus on whether these conclusions is applicable for controlled-type companies whi ch are special.
The company of this type tends to have a relatively fixed agency cost the size of which is denoted by , and its parameter of corporate governance is also largely determin ed by its controlling community. The controlling community has tight control over the co mpany, as causes that the probability of their expropriation being revealed (i.e. ) a nd the punishment for their expropriation (i.e. ) tend to be negligible. Therefore, th e agency cost of the company will not be determined by the quality of corporate gover nance in the way we have elaborated in section 2.1. The parameter which is determin ed by the controlling community should satisfies to ensure that their expropriatio n can't be restricted by corporate governance. For the company of this kind, we treat its agency cost as an exogenous parameter which is determined by the history and life-cy cle of the company. However, it's easy to verify that the agency cost can still affect the o utside investors' of its stocks in the way we have analyzed in section 2.2, that is, the for mulas (2.8) and (2.9) are still valid for the company.
For the company in this kind, by formula (3.1), the probability that the discount rate o f a noise trader's estimation on each share relative to its real value is larger than ( ) should be for any , . Here, we deem the agency cost constant. Though satisfies that , it doesn't change with the parameter of corporate governance, as differs from general-type companies. We have the following conclusions for controlled -type companies. Proposition 6. Suppose that . At the time of , for any , the probabilit y that the discount rate of the market price of each share relative to its fair value is large r than is: where and are defined by equation (3.2) and (5.1) respectively. Additionally, for any , .
The proof of Proposition 6 is almost identical to that of Proposition 2. Based on Proposit ion 6, we can derive the following proposition which is similar to Proposition 3. Proposition 7. An increase in the degree of noise traders' participation in trading (i.e. ) will enhance liquidity of stocks generally in market. Improvements of corporate governa nce of the company have the effect of increasing the liquidity of its stocks if .
The process of its proof is almost the same as that of Proposition 3. We only need to n otice that it still holds that for any , though there is some differenc e between defined by equation (5.1) and that defined by equation (3.1).
Proposition 7 indicates that for the company of this special type, corporate governance still has the effect to increase the liquidity of its stocks, though the constraint of corporat e governance on the scale of its agency cost is very weak and its agency cost tend to be fixed. Simply speaking, the reason is that better corporate governance can send positive signals to noise traders who have incomplete information and need to estimate the value of its stocks, as reduces the probability that they underestimate the value and motivates them to provide liquidity for its stocks with a higher bid. This is also the economic intuiti on that underlies our deduction in this part.
In addition, the conclusions of Proposition 4 and Proposition 5 also hold for the compa nies of this special type and the proofs of them are almost identical to those of Propositi on 4 and Proposition 5, so we will not repeat them.
Conclusions and Suggestions
Summarizing the analyses and derivations in this paper, we conclude that good corpor ate governance has the effect of increasing liquidity of stocks of listed companies, but an important condition for apparent occurrence of this effect is that there exists noise trade rs with incomplete information in the market and they are involved in trading to some ex tent. Our theoretical model further implies that an increase in the degree of noise traders' participation in trading can enhancing this effect. Additionally, it has been widely accept ed that an increase in the degree of noise traders' participating in trading has the effect of promoting the liquidity of stocks. Our model also implies that an improvement in corpo rate governance can reinforcing this effect. Thus, we reveal that corporate governance a nd the degree of noise traders' participation have a synergistic effect in elevating the liqu idity level of stocks.
For investors, buying and holding the stocks of the companies with good corporate gov ernance is a potential channel to improve the liquidity of their portfolios, especially durin g the periods when noise traders are active in investment. For those investors who have to sell out a large number of stocks shortly, it may be sensible for them to give priority to selling the stocks of companies with relatively better corporate governance. This strateg y is likely to reduce their loss caused by the large sales volume in a short time. For a liste d company, improving corporate governance is a potential channel to increase the liquidit y of its stocks in the secondary market, especially during the periods when noise traders are active in investment.
